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Abstract 
This paper examines the voting behavior of individuals in the 1 992 presidential elec­
tion. Employing a multinomial probit model we disprove several commonly held beliefs 
regarding the uniqueness of the election and the mood of the voters. We show emphat­
ically the dominance of the economy as an issue, and that Clinton, not Perot, was the 
beneficiary of economic discontent. We show the limited influence of the candidates' ef­
forts at choosing the optimal ideological position. We also demonstrate, via simulations 
of the outcome under hypothetical distributions of preferences, that the effect of the 
economy, while large, cannot by itself explain the magnitude of Bush's defeat. We also 
prove the surprisingly powerful impact of the candidates' positions on abortion on voters' 
choices. And we disprove the stylized fact that the 1992 election was characterized by 
"angry voters. " Finally, we show that Perot took more votes from Bush than he did from 
Clinton. 
VOTER CHOICE IN 1992: 
ECONOMICS, ISSUES, AND ANGER * 
R. Michael Alvarez Jonathan Nagler 
1 Introduction
The influence of different factors on presidential elections has been a research topic in 
political science for the greater part of this century, and fascinates the media and the 
public every four years. The leading candidates for determining election outcomes are 
the state of the economy, the positions of the candidates and voters on the issues, and 
the effectiveness of the candidates' campaigns. The widespread economic distress in the 
early 1 990s led many to believe that the national economy was of prime importance 
in accounting for George Bush's defeat in 1 992 .  Alternatively, some argue that this 
transition of power occurred only because the Democrats were able to present a "New 
Democrat" ticket which was moderate enough to appeal to Democrats who had previously 
supported Reagan and Bush. In addition to these two interpretations concentrating on 
major party candidates, the strong showing of Ross Perot has been interpreted as evidence 
that many voters were angry at Washington and eager to break from the status quo. 
In this paper we explore three primary explanations of the 1 992 election. First, we 
consider the effect of the economy. Second, we consider the impact of issues and ideology. 
We examine both the general liberal-conservative issue dimension and several specific 
issues expected to be important to voters. Third, we examine whether or not Perot's 
strong showing was due largely to the level of "anger" in the electorate, and hence a 
phenomenon not necessarily likely to repeat itself. And we introduce a methodological 
technique new to analyses of elections - multinomial probit - to handle the complexity 
of a three-carrdidateTace·irr·a way that·is consistent�with the substantive questions being 
examined. 
*The data employed in this paper were gathered by the National Election Studies and made available 
by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Earlier versions of part of this 
research were presented at the Political Methodology Summer Conference, Tallahassee, Florida, July 
1993, and at the Annual Meetings of the Southern Political Science Association, Savannah, Georgia, 
November 1993. We thank Larry Bartels and Brian Roberts for their contributions, and Abby Delman 
for her assistance. 
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1.1 The Economy 
The first and most popular of the three prevailing wisdoms about the 1 992 election is the 
"it's the economy, stupid" school of thought. The electoral significance of the recent state 
of the economy has been well documented in political science research on elections, which 
has shown that voters evaluate the prior performance of the economy under the opposing 
parties and choose the party which has the best economic record (albeit weighing the
recent past more heavily than the distant past) [Fiorina 1981 ;  Kiewiet 1 983; Markus
1 988; Rosenstone 1984; Tufte 1978]. 
This retrospective economic voting model suggests that this election was a referendum 
on the lackluster performance of the economy under George Bush. The 1 992 election 
occurred at the end of the worst four-year stretch of economic performance in most 
voters' memories, with disposable per capita income growing a net total of only 1 % 
during Bush's term. In contrast, the two previous Reagan terms had generated net 
increases of 8 . 5% and 6 . 6%, and Carter's term had seen an increase of 7 .3% (U.S. Census
Bureau 1 993). But the retrospective voting model is inadequate as a simple decision rule 
for voters in the 1 992 election. First, voters had two choices if they were to vote "no" 
on Bush: Clinton or Perot. And second, retrospective voters had virtually no way to tell 
how the economy would have performed had Perot been the incumbent, since he had no 
prior record of macro-economic performance to campaign upon. Thus, the retrospective 
model of voting offers no guidance as to how voters dissatisfied with the economy would 
choose between Clinton and Perot. Our analysis enables us to examine how voters who 
based their decision on a negative evaluation of the economy chose between the remaining 
two non-incumbent candidates. 
1.2 Ideology and Iss ues 
A second popular account of the election is that Bush was unable to smear Clinton with 
the "L" word (liberal) as he did to Dukakis in 1 988, and that this contributed to Bush's
loss. Proponents of this account interpret the election as vindication of Clinton's acumen 
in taking correct positions on key issues, and of his campaign's skill in avoiding being 
characterized by Bush as something the electorate did not want. This account implies 
that ideology and issues played a substantial role in the 1 992 election. That ideology 
and issues have important roles in presidential elections is not in dispute (Carmines
and Stimson 1 980; Jackson 1975; Key 1 966; Page and Brody 1 972; Page and Jones 
1 979; Pomper 1972). Rather, the contemporary issue-voting literature has focused on 
how much issues matter, and on which issues matter in different elections (Abramson,
Aldrich and Rohde 1 983, 1 987, 1 990, 1994). 
The usual formulation of issue voting follows the spatial model of voting, in which 
voters choose the candidate closest to themselves on the issues
. (Downs 1956; Enelow and
Hinich 1 984). This requires that voters are presented with candidates clearly distinguish­
able on their positions on several major issues (Shepsle 1 972; Page 1 978). Yet, to the
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extent that voters are not certain of these issue positions of the three candidates, they 
may not be be able to employ these issues in their decisions (Alvarez 1992). Clearly,
application of this model is problematic with the presence of Ross Perot. For it requires 
that voters determine the issue placement of a third candidate who promised severe 
and identifiable changes in fiscal policy, but was unclear and unknown on many other 
issues. There were of course other factors - such as the media exposure of the candi­
dates and their attempts to disseminate information about themselves to the voters -
which worked to make such a voting rule more plausible. The 1 992 election is one of the 
few in recent history in which two of the candidates had their campaign platforms and 
pledges published and for sale at bookstores. In the analysis below we show which issues 
influenced the voters' choices of candidates, and measure the impact of several issues. 
1.3 Anger 
The third piece of folk-wisdom regarding the 1992 presidential election is that it was 
influenced by a horde of alienated voters turned off by Washington, fed-up with politics 
as usual, disgusted with partisan "gridlock" , and seeking to overturn the status quo. 
The "angry voter" hypothesis seems to be a favored one among anecdotal coverage of the 
election. For example, Germond and Witcover titled their 1 993 account of the election 
Mad As Hell: Revolt at the Ballot Box, 1 992. This account has also been fueled by 
increased turnout in 1 992 .  Allegedly these angry voters were inspired to vote by the 
availability of an anti-status quo choice, and may have provided the basis for Perot's 
support. We believe it is important to distinguish "angry voters" from issue voters who 
prefer alternative policy choices. We think that a more precise way to characterize these 
" t " . t' t t . . b angry vo ers lS as an 1-s a us quo voters, or anti-mcum ent voters. 
The presence of a seemingly viable third candidate presents both methodological and 
theoretical challenges for political scientists. A three-candidate race is much more difficult 
to understand theoretically and empirically than a two-candidate race, since the assump­
tions of the usual models we apply - from the standard two-candidate spatial model 
of elections, to probit and logit econometric models - may be incorrect, and inferences 
drawn from them may be erroneous. Spatial models of elections in one dimension usually 
depend on two candidates reaching equilibrium; with three candidates the situation is 
much less tractable. And economic voting models are based upon comparisons between 
two candidates. Finally, the usual logit and probit estimation techniques are based on 
a binary choice facing the voter. There have been several important works in political 
science that deal with three-candidate elections (Converse et al. 1 969, Rosenstone 1984).
However, we think we break new ground with the econometric-�pproach we use here.
In this paper we simultaneously examine each of the above hypotheses with a multi­
nomial probit model of the election. We demonstrate several interesting findings. First, 
it was the economy. Voters' opinions about the state of the national economy in 1 992 
were dramatically different than they were in 1 988, and our estimates show that this had 
a large effect on their vote-choice. Second, we demonstrate that while the ideological 
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positions of the candidates were important to the voters, voters' perceptions of the two 
major party candidates on the liberal-conservative dimension were virtually unchanged 
from 1 988. And we demonstrate that no matter which plausible ideological placement 
of the candidates we examine the result of the election would not have changed. How­
ever, we show that issues did matter . Perot voters were influenced by the issue Perot 
emphasized the most: the deficit. And we show that Bush's posturing on abortion had 
a surprisingly large impact. Finally, we demonstrate that while Perot may have been 
especially appealing to angry voters, it remains for someone to demonstrate what these 
voters were angry about. For we show that voters interested in "anti-government" reform 
(term-limits) were no more supportive of Perot than other voters, and that voters who 
were upset about the economy were no more likely to support Perot than other voters, 
since such voters went overwhelmingly in Clinton's direction. 
2 A First Look at the 1992 Election
Before proceeding to analyze a multivariate model we first examine the choices made 
by voters, broken down by several factors: their evaluation of the change in the past 
year of their personal finances and of the national economy, their partisan identification, 
their gender, their vote-choice in 1 988, and their positions on term-limits, the deficit, and 
abortion. The data we use are from the National Election Study (Miller, Kinder, and 
Rosenstone 1 993). 
It is the relationship between respondents' economic evaluations and their vote-choice 
that is most striking in Table 1 .  The more likely respondents were to negatively evaluate 
the change in their own personal finances, the less likely they were to vote for Bush; 
while the opposite was true for Clinton. This same relationship is even more pronounced 
when examining respondents' evaluations of the national economy and their likelihood 
of voting for Bush. Here we also see hints of one robust finding about this election: 
those most dissatisfied with the national economy did not turn to Perot. Clinton and 
Perot split almost equally the non-Bush voters who felt the national economy had gotten 
better (1 5 . 8% for Clinton and 13 . 2% for Perot). But among non-Bush voters who felt 
the national economy had gotten worse, Clinton was the overwhelming choice relative to 
Perot (55 . 4% for Clinton and 18 . 6% for Perot). 
Not surprisingly, party identification has the expected implications for the two major 
party candidates: both were the choice of significantly more than 50% of their own 
partisans, though Bush had a significant},y high�r d�f�ctfon�1r1;tte,."than . .  Clinton (29 . 5% 
versus 2 1 . 1  % ) . The Perot results are also as expected: he drew more strongly from 
independents than from partisans; and we see - in line with Bush's weak hold on voters -
that Perot did better in an absolute sense among Republicans than Democrats. But for 
both sets of partisans Perot picked up approximately the same share of defectors: 68% 
of Republican defectors (1 35 out of 1 98) and 64% of Democratic defectors (1 14  out of 
1 78). 
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A significant factor in recent presidential voting has been the gender gap. Yet, the 
gender results from 1992 are somewhat surprising. The Democratic-Republican gender­
gap is clearly visible; with Clinton running 19  points ahead of Bush among women 
compared to only 8 points ahead among men. Yet Bush's share of the vote is constant 
across men and women: it is the Clinton-Perot split that changes across genders. Clinton 
runs significantly better among women than men; and Perot runs significantly better 
among men than among women. Since one would expect Bush to be running better 
among men than among women, this suggests that the relatively strong performance of 
Perot among men came at Bush's expense. 
Examining the change in behavior of voters from 1 988 to 1992 reveals two rather 
striking facts about where Perot's support originated. First, 45% of the voters who 
supported Bush in 1 988 deserted him in 1 992 .  And second, of the voters who supported 
Bush in 1 988 but defected to another of the candidates in 1 992, almost half voted for 
Perot. This finding can be interpreted in two - mutually exclusive - ways: Perot was 
taking voters from Bush; or, voters who would have defected from Bush anyway were 
going to Perot rather than to Clinton. Our multivariate analysis below gives us the means 
to determine which of these is closer to the truth. 
Next, the question of term limits offers a test of the "angry-voter" hypothesis. Pre­
sumably, if voters are angry they will favor the forced retirements of the targets of their 
anger. However, we find no noticeable difference in Perot's support between those favor­
ing term limits and those opposed to term limits. Thus amongst a group of voters we 
can identify as angry, Perot does no better among the angry than among the satisfied. 
The deficit is another issue that strikes the "angry voter" chords, but it also resonates 
more generally under typical notions of issue voting. One view is that the size of the 
federal deficit - in the face of both major parties' promise to shrink it - is a symbol 
of government's lack of responsibility. Another view is that the size of the deficit is 
simply an issue for which different people have different preferences. Respondents were 
not asked their opinions of the size of the deficit directly. However, when asked in an 
open-ended question to name the most important problems facing the country, 28 .  7% 
of respondents offered the deficit as one of their top three problems. We cannot infer 
from respondents claiming the deficit is an important problem that they think a particular 
candidate would best solve it. But Perot was the candidate who took the strongest stance 
on the importance of deficit reduction, and was willing to promise the most - even new 
taxes - to solve it. And 22 . 9% of respondents who listed the size of the deficit as one of 
the three most important issues facing the country voted for Perot, while only 15 . 9% of 
those not listing,,the.,·aeficit·voted ·J0r�·Pe:rot. .,'.J:'-hus �t·he-issm� ·that"·Perot··emphasized the 
most appeared to resonate with the voters. 
Another issue where one candidate stood apart from the other two was abortion. 
Bush differed strongly from his two opponents: he was opposed to abortion, a stance 
underscored during the Republican convention and throughout the campaign. Pro-choice 
forces were unequivocal in their opposition to Bush. The NES gave respondents four 
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choices to identify their positions on abortion, ranging from "abortion should never be 
permitted" to "by law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a 
matter of personal choice. " As Table 1 shows, respondents choosing the three more 
anti-abortion alternatives were almost twice as likely to vote for Bush as respondents 
declaring themselves pro-choice. The fact that a respondent's position on abortion is 
so discriminating a factor in determining whom he or she would vote for suggests that 
abortion was a major issue in the 1 992 election. 
2.1 New Democrat? 
Last, we offer evidence bearing on the "Clinton as 'New Democrat" ' hypothesis. A central 
tenet of this hypothesis is that voters perceived Clinton differently than they perceived 
Dukakis. Table 2 shows respondents' self-placement, and placement of Bush and Dukakis 
on the NES 7-point liberal-conservative scale in 1 988, placement of Bush, Clinton, and 
Perot on the liberal-conservative scale in 1 992, and the mean ideological distance between 
respondents and each of the candidates for both elections. Ideological distance between 
the respondent and the candidate was computed as the absolute value of the difference 
between the respondent's self-placement and the mean of all respondents' placement of 
the candidate. Using the mean placement for the candidate, rather than the respondent's 
own placement of the candidate, reduces problems of projection. 1
Table 2 reveals something very startling: the electorate did not perceive Clinton to 
be a moderate Democrat. The mean placement of Clinton in 1 992 (3 . 1 9) was actually 
. 05 to the left of the mean placement of Dukakis in 1 988 (3 . 24) on the NES 7-point 
liberal-conservative scale. Alternatively, Clinton's placement was 1 . 02 to the left of the 
overall respondent mean in 1 992 (3 . 1 9  versus 4 . 2 1), whereas Dukakis' placement was 
1 . 1 3 to the left of the overall respondent mean in 1 988 (3 . 24 versus 4 . 37). Hence, to 
the extent that Clinton moved closer to the center of the ideological spectrum than 
Dukakis was, he did so by barely 1 0% of the distance Dukakis needed to move to reach 
the center. And finally, comparing the mean distance between Clinton and each voter, 
and Dukakis and each voter, we see respective scores of 1 .46 and 1 . 50 .  Again, any way 
we examine the data, Clinton simply did not convince the electorate he was different 
from Dukakis on the broad liberal-conservative ideological continuum. It is possible that 
distinctions between Clinton and Dukakis led respondents to weigh different issues in 
evaluating relative placements on the liberal-conservative dimension. Clinton did not 
share Dukakis' aversion to the death-penalty, nor did Clinton carry an ACLU card. And 
Clinton advocated a brand of welfare reform that was not perceived as very liberal. 2 But
respondents' evaluations on the liberal-conservative
" 
dimension sugg�st, that Clinton's
status as a "new Democrat" could not have accounted for much towards his victory, 
because voters saw him as an old Democrat - they perceived Clinton to be as liberal as 
Dukakis. 
These simple analyses provide some insight into the 1992 election. The data in Tables 
1 and 2 suggest that the "angry voter" hypothesis may not be supported, that Clinton's 
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claim to be a new Democrat could not have affected the election, that abortion was a 
major issue in 1 992, and that the economy was dominant and Clinton - not Perot -
won the battle for the economic discontents. However, to take into consideration the 
three-candidate choice process, and to further develop the above findings and show that 
they are not the spurious artifacts of two-by-two tables, we use multivariate analysis to 
disentangle and to estimate the effects of different factors on individuals' vote-choices; as 
well as to determine the impact of Perot on the election. 
3 Multivariate Analysis of the 1992 Election
In order to answer the questions posed above and distinguish between the relative "cor­
rectness" of the different folk-wisdoms and theories about the election, a methodology is 
required that allows us to evaluate the effects of individual characteristics and candidate 
characteristics in a three-candidate setting. The multinomial probit model we employ 
allows us to do these things (Bolduc 1 992; Bunch 199 1 ;  Daganzo 1 979; Dansie 1 985;
Hausman and Wise 1 9 78). We estimate separate coefficients relating individual char­
acteristics of the respondents to their preference for each candidate, as well as a single 
coefficient for a candidate-specific trait: ideological-distance from the respondent. 
To estimate a model of the 1 992 election using traditional techniques we could proceed 
in three ways: 1 )  ignore the Perot candidacy and estimate models of binomial choices be­
tween Clinton and Bush; 2) estimate an ordered probit model; or 3) estimate multinomial 
logit models including Perot as a choice. 
We think the first two of these techniques are badly flawed, and that multinomial logit 
has potential problems in this application. The first technique ignores the preferences of 
almost 20% of the electorate. More importantly, throwing out the third candidate and 
estimating binary-choice models on the remaining candidates is a clear case of selecting on 
the dependent variable, which will generate inconsistent estimates (Manski and Lerman
1 977). The problem is probably easiest to see in a case where one choice is clearly distinct 
from the others. For instance, to treat Wallace voters in 1 968 as missing data and then 
assume that they would have behaved as others of similar socio-economic status and issue­
preferences behaved - on the few issue-preferences we have measures of - is to ignore a 
rather important fact about these voters: they did not behave as the Nixon/Humphrey
voters behaved since they voted for Wallace. And the fact that they voted for Wallace 
should suggest to us that they were different from the voters who chose not to vote for 
Wallace. The sam� logic et,pplies to the Perot voters: ,  �h�y_,xn�y be diffe.repJ than the Bush 
and Clinton voters. 
The second approach, using ordered probit (McKelvey and Zavoina 1975) is also prob­
lematic. The ordered probit model assumes that the choices can be ordered on a uni­
dimensional continuum. Since we are explicitly considering that voters may perceive 
multiple dimensions - issues and the economy - this model would be inappropriate. 
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The third technique, multinomial logit, assumes that the random disturbance terms 
associated with each candidate for each voter are independent. This is equivalent to 
making the strong behavioral assumption of "Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives" 
(IIA) with regard to the random disturbances in the model. This assumption implies
that the ratio of the probability of choosing the first candidate to the probability of 
choosing the second candidate is unchanged by the availability of the third candidate. 
Since we do not have strong prior beliefs about the relationship between the disturbances 
for the candidates we prefer to avoid using a model making such a strong assumption 
about those disturbances. The multinomial probit model we use allows us to avoid this 
assumption.3
3.1 Model Specification 
Models of binary choices generally deal with characteristics that vary by individual, not 
that vary by choice. The choices in such models can simply be described as "box number 
1 "  and "box number 2 . "  In polychotomous choice models it may be more desirable to 
measure characteristics of the alternatives. An advantage of measuring characteristics 
of the alternatives is that we can determine the effect of adding a choice with given 
characteristics. It also allows us to make use of observable distinguishing features among 
the alternatives. 
Following Hausman and Wise (1 978) we begin by defining the random utility of each 
voter over each of the three candidates in the 1 992 election: 
(1 ) 
where ai is a vector of characteristics unique to the voter i, Xij is a vector of character­
istics unique to candidate j (j = 1 ,2,3) with respect to voter i, 'l/;j and /3 are vectors of
parameters to be estimated, and c is a disturbance term. We assume that the three error 
terms (ci, c2, c3 ) have a multivariate normal distribution, and we allow the errors to be
correlated across the candidates. We also assume the error variances are homoskedastic. 
So, with the multinomial probit model we can account for the error correlations across 
the three utility functions without assuming a specific structure for the choice process. 
As usual, we assume the individual votes for the candidate offering the highest utility. 
Using the multinomial probit model only one coefficient is estimated per characteristic 
of the alternatives. For characteristics that vary by individuals we must estimate (M- 1)  
coefficients per ·c..frareeter-istic;·'where •M¥isv·the-numher-"'t>�choices .. ,,.q:ihus'·in the present
case we estimate two coefficients per individual characteristic. One coefficient gives the 
effect of a change in the variable on the respondent's utility of voting for Bush relative to 
Perot, the other coefficient gives the effect of a change in the variable on the respondent's 
utility of voting for Clinton relative to Perot. The estimation of this model is discussed 
in Appendix I. 
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The data we use to estimate the model come from the 1 992 American National Election 
Study (Miller, Kinder, and Rosenstone 1 993). Because very little data was available
regarding voters' impressions of Perot we have only one choice-specific variable in the 
model: the ideological distance between the voter and each candidate. As discussed 
above, we estimate a single coefficient for the effects of ideological distance across the 
three candidates. 4  As described earlier, the distance between the voter's position and the 
candidate's position was constructed as the squared difference between the respondent's 
self-placement on the NES seven-point ideology scale and the candidate's mean placement 
on the same scale by all respondents. 
We used the respondents' assessments of the change in their personal finances over 
the past year, and the respondents' assessments of the change in the national economy 
over the past year to measure the influences of economic evaluations on the respondents' 
vote choices. For both variables pessimistic responses were coded higher . 
To measure the impact of policy issues we included respondents' opinions of whether 
it is the government's role to provide: jobs for citizens; health care; and assistance to 
minorities. Each of these responses was coded on a seven-point scale, with conservative 
responses coded higher . Furthermore, we measured respondents' opinions on abortion 
with a question offering four choices to describe their views of appropriate government 
involvement in the issue, with pro-choice responses coded higher . 
We included respondents' approval or disapproval of term limits for politicians to test 
the angry-voter hypothesis (approval coded higher ) . We have two other measures which,
to varying degrees, may shed light on the angry voter hypothesis. First, we have the 
respondents' reporting of whether they voted in 1 988 .  If the respondent did not vote in 
1988, but did vote in 1 992, then the "angry voter" hypothesis would suggest that this 
was a voter coming out in 1 992 solely to demonstrate anger, and hence should vote for 
the anti-status-quo choice: Perot. Second, we included the respondent's assessment of 
whether the deficit was one of the three most important issues facing the country to 
determine whether Perot's primary issue was effective for him. As noted earlier, to the 
extent that attaching importance to the deficit defines an angry voter, then voters who 
viewed the deficit as important should have gone to Perot as "angry-voters. " 
We also included several measures of respondents' characteristics expected to influence 
vote-choice. We included the respondents' education, age, gender, and party-affiliation. 
Education was measured by respondent's years of schooling . We expected, ceteris paribus, 
for more educated voters to prefer Bush to Clinton or Perot. It was difficult to have a 
priori expectatious.,i;egardjng . •  Rerot-,,versus ... Glinto11.- -Rather--th.-an""assume a linear rela­
tionship between age and candidate-preference we included three dummy variables for 
age: 1 8-29, 30-44, and 45-59; with persons 60 or over being the excluded group. If voters 
develop party loyalty over time, then younger voters should have been more perceptive to 
Perot's appeal. We included dummy variables for Democratic and Republican partisans 
(we included those leaning towards one of the parties as partisans) , leaving Independents
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as the omitted category. To allow for regional effects, we specified the model with three 
dummy variables, with the Midwest being the excluded category. 
With this specification, we can determine the validity of the three major accounts of 
the 1 992 election we discussed earlier . To examine the economic voting account, we look 
to the coefficients on the economic assessments variables. For the issues and ideology 
explanations, the estimated effects of both candidate ideology and respondent attitudes 
on the four policy issues will be important. Last, for the angry voter hypothesis, we are 
interested in the effects of respondents' evaluations of term limits and the deficit on voter 
choice, as well as the behavior of those voters who did not vote in 1 988, but did vote in 
1 992 .  
3.2 The Multinomial Probit Results 
The estimates of the multinomial probit model are presented in Table 3 . 5  The column on 
the far left gives the independent variables, and the other columns give the coefficients 
for Bush relative to Perot, and Clinton relative to Perot, respectively. The coefficients 
can be used to generate predicted probabilities for each individual voting for any of 
the three candidates. Using the mean probability as the predicted vote-share for each 
candidate, our model predicts the proportions of voters for each candidate quite well. In 
the sample used to generate these estimates, 34. 1 % of respondents voted for Bush, 45 . 8% 
for Clinton, and 20.0% for Perot.6 Our model predicts a three-candidate vote outcome of 
34. 0% for Bush, 46.0% for Clinton, and 20. 1 % for Perot. 7 We generated predicted vote­
choices for each individual using the algorithm that a person's vote is assigned to the 
candidate which that person has the highest estimated probability of voting for. Using 
this method the overall correct prediction rate for the multinomial probit model across 
the three candidates is 74 . 0%. 
Before turning to individual coefficients, note that, as with any non-linear model, 
determining the relative effect of each variable on the probability of supporting one of the 
three candidates is contingent upon the values of all other variables. Therefore, our initial 
discussion of our estimates is brief, describing only which coefficients reach statistical 
significance. Following our initial discussion of the estimates we present analyses of the 
effects of the important independent variables based on first-differences which we report 
below in Table 4. 
3.2. 1 The Ecoilomy 
In line with recent work on economic voting (e.g., Kinder and Kiewiet 198 1), we find that
a voter's assessment of his or her personal financial condition did not have a statistically 
significant influence on which candidate he or she supported in 1 992. However, we see a 
very strong effect of the voter's assessment of the state of the national economy over the 
past year. Respondents who perceived that the national economy had deteriorated over 
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the past year were significantly less likely to support Bush relative to Perot. And such 
respondents were significantly more likely to support Clinton than Perot. This suggests 
that Perot was unable to convert his reputation as a businessperson into a perception 
among voters that he would be able to fix the economy. Thus, while it is no surprise that 
Bush was hurt by the economy, it was crucial for Clinton that he, not Perot, was the big 
winner from the negative perceptions on the economy. 
3.2.2 Ideology and Issues 
We estimated only one coefficient for the effect of ideological distance between the re­
spondent and the candidate. The estimated effect is negative and statistically significant, 
as expected. The closer a voter was to one of the three candidates, the more likely he or 
she was to support that candidate, ceteris paribus. 
Of  the five specific issues we examine in this model, we see that only two had significant 
influences on the choice between Bush and Perot: government-sponsored health care and 
abortion rights. These results show that those who supported a government-run health 
care system were more likely to support Perot relative to Bush. This is not too surprising, 
since most voters must have perceived that Bush was against a state-run health care 
system, while Perot's position may have been unclear . Additionally, those who were 
"pro-life" supported Bush and those who were "pro-choice" supported Perot, which is 
consistent with the clear stands taken by both Bush and Perot on this issue. The impact 
of respondents' opinions on abortion on their willingness to vote for Bush was quite large. 
For the Clinton versus Perot comparison, we see one significant issue effect: govern­
ment assistance for minorities. Here we see that those who supported continuation of 
such assistance by the national government were much more likely to support Clinton 
than Perot. Note that this issue matters in addition to general liberal-conservative posi­
tions. Given that this was the only significant coefficient for issue variables distinguishing 
Clinton and Perot, and given that this effect is neither large nor compelling, issues were 
probably not what separated Clinton from Perot in the minds of the voters. 
In an election year with a slumping economy, the issue of government provision of jobs 
appeared to have had no effect on voter choice. Despite all of Clinton's campaign rhetoric 
about the importance of a government role in the economy, the question of government 
provision of jobs did not seem to matter as much as assessments of the state of the 
national economy. 
3.2. 3 Angry Voters 
One of the common interpretations of the 1 992 election is that Perot was able to mobilize 
hordes of disaffected or normally uninterested voters. However, we find that people who 
reported voting in 1 992 but did not participate in the 1 988 election were more likely 
to vote for Bush than Perot, though more likely to vote for Perot than Clinton, when 
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compared to people who did not report voting in 1 988. In other words, of those who did 
not vote in 1 988, the voters who were mobilized to participate in the 1992 election were 
more likely to prefer Bush, the incumbent, than the two alternatives. Hence, again we 
find no support for the "angry voter" scenario. 
Further, the coefficients for voters' opinion of term limits for politicians were not 
significant. And if anything, those who supported term limits were marginally less likely 
to support Perot relative to either of the two candidates. This leads us to believe that 
term limits was not the critical focus of the "angry voters" , nor that it lead them to 
support Perot. Thus the "angry-voter" issue was overblown by the media. 
3.2.4 Respondents' Characteristics 
Partisanship produced results as anticipated. Self-styled Republicans were overwhelm­
ingly more likely to support Bush than Perot, while professed Democrats supported 
Clinton relative to Perot. Republicans appeared more likely to support Perot relative to 
Clinton, and Democrats appeared more likely to support Perot relative to Bush; though 
neither of these latter two effects reached statistical significance. Thus Perot's edge 
amongst Republican and Democratic defectors exhibited in Table 1 receives some sup­
port here, though it is not conclusive. 
The demographic results produced some surprises. While women were significantly 
less likely than men to vote for Perot, controlling for all of the other variables in the 
model, the coefficient for the gender variable is twice the magnitude for Bush as for 
Clinton. Thus, all other things being equal, female voters were more likely to support 
Bush than were male voters. This is an unexpected yet important result given the 
"gender-gap" between the parties, and given that even in 1 992 the bivariate split among 
respondents showed Clinton doing ten points better among women than among men. In 
a fully specified model, there is no Clinton-Bush gender gap. Or, the observed bivariate 
gender-gap can be explained by characteristics of the respondents other than their gender. 
It may partly be explained because Perot took male supporters from Bush, making Bush 
appear weaker relative to Clinton among men than he otherwise would have. 
The age dummy variables were coded with the oldest respondents ( 60 and older ) being
the excluded category. The age coefficients demonstrate that both Bush and Clinton did 
better among older voters, while Perot appealed more to younger voters. Younger voters 
may have had less firm partisan allegiances and hence been more susceptible to Perot's 
appeal. Both Bush .. and .. Clinton, ... did •. hetter .. .than .. I?..e.wt-among . .edtlcated voters, but the
effect reaches statistical significance only for Bush. The clearest regional effect observed 
is Perot's poorer showing in the South, ceteris paribus, relative to the rest of the country 
when compared to both Bush and Clinton. 8 
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3.2.5 C h o ice P rocess 
Last, notice that we do not estimate sizeable correlations between the error terms in the 
multinomial probit model. The largest correlation involves Bush and Perot (. 27). This 
suggests that on some unobserved attributes voters perceived Perot to be similar to Bush. 
But none of the estimated correlations are statistically significant at traditional levels. 
Note that this does not mean that the IIA condition is not violated in the election; this 
simply means that the non-systematic component of voters' utility does not account for a 
violation. We show below in our ideology simulations that the presence of a third choice, 
Perot, had an impact on the relative vote shares of the other two candidates . .  
3.3 The Magnitude of Effects of the Independent Variables 
Since the coefficients in Table 3 are translated into probabilities in a complex way we 
present "first-differences" in Table 4 (King 1 989). This shows the change in estimated
probability of choosing each of the three candidates based on changes in specific inde­
pendent variables. For instance, the first row shows the estimated probabilities of an 
individual choosing Bush, Clinton, or Perot if she felt her personal finances had im­
proved in the past year·. The second row indicates the predicted probabilities for the 
same respondent had she felt her personal finances had gotten worse in the past year. 
The difference between the predicted probabilities in the two rows represents the effect 
of the respondent changing her view of her personal finances from better to worse. Since 
the changes in probabilities from changing one independent variable depend upon the 
values of the other independent variables, we performed all these calculations on a hy­
pothetical individual who would have had virtually identical probabilities of supporting 
each candidate. This hypothetical voter was female, was of average education, believed 
the economy and her personal finances were unchanged over the past year, was an inde­
pendent from the south, had voted in 1 988, was middle-aged (30-44), approved of term 
limits for politicians, was at modal positions on the issues, and was at sample average 
ideological distances from each candidate. 
The first difference reveals very clearly how much more respondents' opinions of the 
national economy mattered than did respondents' opinions of their personal finances. If 
the hypothetical respondent felt her personal finances had gotten worse as opposed to 
better, she was 7% less likely to vote for Bush. However, if this hypothetical respondent 
felt the national economy had gotten worse as opposed to better, she was then 29% 
less likely to vote for Bush. The first differences also reveal how much Clinton was the 
beneficiary of the economic discontent. The hypothetical voter believing the economy 
got worse rather than better was 30% more likely to vote for Clinton but was no more 
likely to vote for Perot. Thus Perot was unable to capitalize on the voters' dissatisfaction 
with the economy. 
The effects of changes in ideology are measured as follows. The "near" row gives the 
probability of the model voter choosing each candidate if she were one unit away from that 
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candidate on the ideological scale. The "far" row gives the probability of the hypothetical 
voter choosing the indicated candidate if she were 2 .4  units from the candidate on the 
ideological scale. Thus for each of the candidates, movement away from a voter would 
reduce the voter's probability of voting for that candidate by approximately . 1 2 .  We 
return to a more detailed analysis of this below. 
Among issues, abortion had a very large impact. If our hypothetical voter were pro­
life, she would have had over a 62% likelihood of voting for Bush. However, if the same 
voter were pro-choice instead of pro-life then, according to our estimates, her probability 
of voting for Bush would have dropped from . 62 to .28 and her probability of voting for 
Clinton would have risen from .22 to . 38 .  Hence a 40% advantage for Bush over Clinton 
would swing to a 1 0% deficit. Thus voters were affected strongly by the candidates' 
positions on abortion. 
The estimated impact of respondents' views on government prov1s1on of minority 
assistance shows that it was a very important issue. If our hypothetical voter believed the 
government should support minorities, she had a .48 estimated probability of supporting 
Clinton, which drops to . 20 if she believed that the government should not provide 
assistance to minorities. The opposite effects are observed in Table 4 for the probability 
of voting for Bush and Perot, since the probability that the same voter supported either of 
them was greater if the voter believed in no government assistance instead of government 
help for minorities. Note that this effect is estimated controlling for general liberal­
conservative ideology. Thus while Clinton was not Dukakis, he was more appealing than 
either Perot or Bush to people who believed in additional government assistance for 
minorities; and he was less appealing than Perot or Bush to people who did not believe 
in additional government assistance for minorities. 
Lastly, just as seen in Table 3, the voter's opinion on term limits, which should char­
acterize "angry voting, " had little effect upon the probabilities of voting for any of the 
three candidates. Whether our hypothetical voter supported or opposed term limits re­
sults in less than a 2% change in the likelihood of supporting any of the candidates. 
The deficit potentially had a large impact. If our hypothetical voter shifted her position 
on the importance of the deficit it caused a 10% increase in the likelihood of voting for 
Perot, and a 1 7% decrease in the likelihood of voting for Bush. Thus Bush was held 
accountable for the deficit, and Perot did well on the issue he emphasized. 
4 Effects of Candidate ldeolqgical Movement
While the effect of ideology presented in Table 4 looks large, the apparent impact of 
candidate ideology may be misleading. It is true that a shift in one voter's ideological 
position causes a large swing in probabilities of that voter choosing different candidates. 
But it would be a mistake to think that by choosing a different ideological position (or by
forcing his opponents to appear to represent a different ideological position) a candidate
could have significantly raised his vote-share. For, by improving his ideological proximity 
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relative to some voters, a candidate must simultaneously worsen his ideological proximity 
to other voters. To test the effect of strategic behavior on the part of the candidates with 
regard to positioning themselves on the liberal-conservative dimension we simulated the 
effect of each candidate moving across the ideological space, holding the position of 
the other two candidates unchanged. We performed this simulation by computing the 
probability of each respondent voting for each of the three candidates. The probabilities 
were recomputed as we held everything fixed except the ideological position of a single 
candidate, whose ideological position was adjusted from 0 . 1  to 7 . 0  in increments of . 02 .  
Figures 1 (a) - 1 ( c) show the predicted vote-share of each candidate (the vertical axis) 
as Bush, Clinton, and Perot, respectively, were moved along- the liberal-conservative 
dimension (the horizontal axis) . The most striking observation is that Bush did not
move too far to the right in the election. According to our estimates, he would have 
received his maximum vote-share (34 . 6%) had he been positioned at 4 . 60 .  Since the 
electorate thought he was at 5 . 05, he was very close to his optimal position; and his 
predicted vote-share at his perceived position was 34.3% . Thus at best Bush could have 
improved his vote-share by 0 . 3% by moving slightly towards the ideological center. Had 
Bush moved too far to the left he would have lost votes, most of which would have gone 
to Perot. Clinton's vote-share would have remained almost constant no matter where 
Bush was perceived to be. 
Similarly, Clinton was also close to his optimal ideological position. His vote-share 
would have been maximized (47 . 3%) had he been perceived to be at 4 . 0  on the ideological 
scale. His perceived position was 3 . 1 9, which gave him a predicted vote-share of 46.4% .  
The interesting thing to note here is that Bush would have had to push the public's 
perception of Clinton way over to one extreme or the other in order for Clinton's vote­
share to have dropped below Bush's vote share. In fact, since the likely place for Bush 
to try to push the perception of Clinton was to the left, Clinton would not have dropped 
below Bush until he hit the very edge of the scale. This is a position on the scale at 
which candidates are simply not likely to be perceived. 
Perot's vote share would have been maximized had he been perceived to be at 4 . 24 
on the ideological scale, where his predicted vote share would have been 20 . 2% .  This 
is virtually indistinguishable from his actual mean perceived position of 4 . 3 1 .  Thus any 
movement from Perot's perceived middle-of-the-road position would have cost him votes. 
And the overall findings from this simulation are clear: perceived ideological movement 
by the candidates would not have affected the election in a significant way. 
5 Effects of Changes in the Distribution of Eco­
nomic Views 
Table 4 indicated the effects of a single voter changing his or her preferences or opinions 
on the issues. And Figures 1 (a )-1 ( c) showed the effects of the candidates moving their
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ideological position. The other interesting counterfactual effect to examine is what would 
have happened under different economic circumstances. What we would really like to 
know is: Was it the economy, stupid? To see this, we want to know what would have 
happened if voters had the same opinions about the economy in 1 992 that they did in 
1 988. To simulate this outcome we examined the distribution of voter preferences on 
the two questions relating to the economy - their personal finances and their view of the 
national economy- for 1 988 and 1 992 .  Then we randomly re-assigned opinions about the 
economy to the 1 992 respondents so that the aggregate distribution of opinions matched 
the 1988 aggregate distribution of opinion. 9  This allowed us to compute the probability 
of voting for each candidate using these hypothetical values for the economic perception 
variables, and the respondents' actual values for all of the other variables. 
Table 5A shows the distributions of opinion about the economy in 1 988 and 1 992 .  
The table demonstrates the huge shift in respondent opinions on the state of the national 
economy from 1 988 to 1 992 .  In 1 988 only 3 1 . 2% of respondents felt the economy had 
gotten worse in the past 1 2  months. In 1 992 this percentage had more than doubled to 
over 72% of respondents. The shift in opinion regarding respondents' personal finances 
is not nearly as severe; but is still significant. Thus, if voters chose to base their decisions 
on the economy, this shift would have been devastating for Bush. 
Table 5B presents the results of the simulation described above. The first row of Table 
5B shows the predicted vote-share for each candidate given the actual values for 1 992. 
The second row gives the predicted vote share when respondents' opinions about their 
personal finances are adjusted to match the 1988 distribution. The third row shows the 
predicted vote share when respondents' opinions about the national economy are adjusted 
to match the 1 988 distribution. And finally the fourth row gives the predicted vote-shares 
when respondents' opinions about both their personal finances and the national economy 
are adjusted to match the 1 988 distributions. The table offers a striking result : if voters' 
beliefs about the economy in 1992 were identical to their beliefs in 1988, then it would 
have changed the margin between Clinton and Bush by 8. 5% . Under the counter-factual 
scenario the gap in the sample between Bush and Clinton is cut by more than two-thirds: 
moving from an 1 1 . 9% rout to a 3 . 4% contestable race. But since the sample we used 
to make these predictions is biased approximately 3% towards Clinton and 3% against 
Bush, an 8 .5% change in the actual electorate would have given Bush a 2 . 9% victory over 
Clinton. Thus, simply put, it was the economy. 
Finally, Perot's share of the vote-total turns out to be essentially independent of voters' 
perceptions of economic circumstances: he goes from a 20 . 1  % share to a 20 . 6% vote-share. 
This is generally-oensistent�with ,observat·ions we�made-eartieP�in .. our··discussions of Tables 
3 and 4. There we saw that our results indicate that, across the electorate, we find little 
which systematically drove people to support the candidacy of Perot. From disaffection 
with the economy, to ideology and issues, and even to general disaffection with the 
national government, we have shown that none of these factors accounts much for the 
reasons people voted for Perot. The only exception to this appears to be respondent 
views on the importance of the deficit. 
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6 Effect of Ros s  Perot
Even so, an important question to ask about the 1992 election is where would the Perot 
voters have gone in his absence? We are able to answer that in a straightforward manner. 
The multinomial pro bit technique gives us an expected utility to each voter for each of the 
three candidates; as well as an estimate of the relationship between the disturbance terms 
for the three candidates. Thus, for each Perot voter, we can compare his or her expected 
utility for Bush to his or her expected utility for Clinton, and utilize our estimate of the 
distribution of the disturbance terms to predict whom they would vote for. 10 The results
are that 49 .5% of the Perot voters would have voted for Bush; 50 .5% would have voted 
for Clinton. 1 1  Thus the Perot voters would have been split almost evenly among the two 
candidates. This means that the Perot voters were not voters who would have deserted 
Bush with or without Perot's presence; in fact they were more likely to be Bush voters 
than was the rest of the voting population. Among the set of Clinton and Bush voters 
the two-way split was 46% versus 34%; which translates to a 57 . 5  and 42 . 5% share of 
the two-party vote, respectively. Thus the Perot voters were more pro-Bush than other 
voters. In the absence of Perot we would predict a 55 .5% Clinton victory in our sample, 
rather than the above-mentioned 57 .5% Clinton victory. Thus Perot's presence inflated 
Clinton's margin over Bush by 4% 
7 Conclusion and Dis cus s ion
Between Perot's candidacy, the state of the economy, and the overwhelming Democratic 
victory, there were many unusual characteristics of the 1 992 election. Our results disprove 
some interpretations of this election. The first common interpretation of the 1 992 election 
we have rebuked is the "angry voter" hypothesis. Voters were angry, but they were 
angry about the state of the economy - not the state of the government. The second 
interpretation we discount is that the outcome occurred because the Democrats succeeded 
in nominating a more moderate candidate. On one hand, our model shows that candidate 
ideology did matter to voters in 1 992, controlling for many other political issues. However, 
the electorate perceived Clinton to be just as liberal as they had perceived Dukakis to be 
in 1 988, and so it cannot be that Clinton won the election by appearing more moderate 
than had Dukakis. In fact, we have shown that the election outcome would have been 
the same no matter how Clinton was perceived on the ideological spectrum. However, we 
should not lose sight of the trees for the forest. Some issues raised during the campaign 
did matter, since Bush's pandering to the right cost him dearly among pro-choice voters. 
This leaves standing the common interpretation that the economy played a key role 
in Clinton's success. Our analysis demonstrates that the national economy was the 
dominant factor in the 1 992 election. Voters in 1992 were overwhelmingly convinced that 
the national economy was in bad shape. The effect of voters' perceptions of the national 
economy was staggering. A respondent who felt the national economy had improved 
was 35% more likely to vote for Bush than Clinton; but if that same respondent felt the 
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economy had deteriorated he or she was 25% more likely to vote for Clinton than Bush! 
Nowhere else do we see such a large shift in voting probabilities, and it suggests the 
magnitude of the impact of economic evaluations. Our aggregate estimates indicate that 
economic change from 1 988 to 1 992 cost Bush 8 . 5% relative to Clinton. And we have 
been able to demonstrate that it was Clinton, not Perot, who obtained a great deal of 
his support from voters dissatisfied with the economy. This is one of our most important 
findings: that Clinton won the battle for the economically dissatisfied. 
But even if voters had perceived the national economy to be in good shape, Bush still 
would have had a much tougher election than he did in 1 988 .  Note that we predicted a 
38 . 0%-41 .4% split between Bush and Clinton under 1 988 economic conditions. When we 
correct this for the slight Clinton bias in our sample, and translate it into a percentage 
of the two-party vote, we get a projected two-party split of 5 1 . 8%-48 . 2% for Bush over 
Clinton in 1 992 under 1 988 economic conditions. This is much closer than the 53 . 8%-
46 . 2% Bush-Dukakis race. Thus, there were obviously other factors at work in Bush's 
loss. Apparently voters were not happy with Bush in 1 992, beyond the effect of the 
economy. 
Thus we think a coherent story of the 1992 election is as follows. First, the over­
whelming dissatisfaction with the economy was a large nail in Bush's coffin. But it 
wasn't necessarily fatal. Perceptions of the economy had Bush starting the race 8 . 5% 
behind where he would have been under 1 988 economic circumstances. This is not in and 
of itself enough to have eliminated him from the race. If one considers that Bush won 
the 1 988 election by 6 .4% then the 8 . 5% handicap does not seem impossible to overcome, 
particularly if Bush had been able to retain some electoral benefit from Desert Storm 
and if one considers Clinton's considerable personal baggage. And despite a challenge 
from the right in the primary, Bush's movement on the ideological liberal-conservative 
dimension did not cause him significant harm. However, given the powerful influence of 
abortion in determining respondents' vote choices it appears that Bush's pro-life stance 
was quite costly. The family values night at the Republican convention may have imposed 
substantial political costs on Bush. 
There are three systematic conclusions we can draw about Perot's candidacy. First, 
the issue that worked for him was the deficit. Second, he took more voters from Bush 
than from Clinton. Third, those voters he took were from a group expected to favor Bush 
heavily over Clinton: men. Beyond this, Perot's appeal seemed to have little systematic 
component. He did not grab the votes of people most dissatisfied with economic perfor­
mance or most desiring change in Washington. Again we have found little support for 
the "angry voter�!-hypethesis,, espeeially··as an"·e;x:planatfoR"for ·the-·¥otes Perot received 
in 1 992 .  We think another point to make about Ross Perot is what has been long known 
about American elections: money buys votes, and money even buys votes in Presidential 
elections amidst the din and storm of the campaign (Jacobson 1 978 ,  Nagler and Leighley 
1 992). 
18 
Last, this election has led us to employ a new methodology to analyze presidential 
election voting: multinomial probit. Most elections in the United States involve only two 
candidates, and political science has well-known theoretical and methodological tools to 
study those elections. As we have argued in this paper, elections involving more than 
two candidates present particular problems for these models. These problems are not 
intractable, but require the use of appropriate methodological tools to insure that the 
results we obtain are not influenced by improper assumptions. 
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8 Appendix I 
8 . 1  Derivation of t he M ulti nomial Probit Mode l  
8 . 1 . 1  The B asics o f  t h e  m o del 
The multinomial probit model allows us to estimate the coefficients of the model while 
assuming the errors are correlated, and to estimate these error correlations. Here, we 
present the details of the multinomial probit model, which follows a framework originally 
proposed by Hausman and Wise ( 1 978) ; though we deviate from those authors in the
specification of the covariance matrix of the error terms. First, we develop the basics of a 
multinomial probit model for a three-candidate election. We then describe our modeling 
of the error variances. 
We define a random utility function for voter i over each candidate j, where j = 1 ,  2, 3 :  
(2) 
where Xij is a vector of characteristics unique to the candidate choice j relative to voter 
i, ai is a vector of characteristics unique to the individual decision maker i, c: is a random 
variable, and U defines the systematic component of the utility function of a voter . U is 
assumed to have the following functional form: 
(3) 
Note that we are assuming that U is a linear function of both the characteristics spe­
cific to the choice (Xii ) and the individual (ai ) , with respective parameters /3 for the
choice-specific characteristics and 'I/Ji for the individual-specific characteristics. The lat­
ter coefficient is subscripted by j to indicate that the effects of the individual-specific 
characteristics vary across choices. 
We assume that the random elements of the utility functions, Eij ,  have a multivariate 
normal distribution with mean zero and covariance matrix: 
(4) 
Now we assume that the voter chooses the candidate who will bring them the greatest 
utility. This gives the following expression for the probability that the individual would 
choose the first of the three alternatives: 
Pr'[(Ui1 > Ui2 ) '&
Pr [ (Ui1 + Ei1 > Ui2 + Ei2 ) &
Pi1 = Pr [ (c:i2 - Ei1 < Ui1 - Ui2 ) &
Following Hausman and Wise ( 1 978 ) ,  we let
'T/i,2 1 
'T/i,31 
C:i2 - Ei1 , 
Ei3 - Ei1 · 
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'fUi1 > Vi3)] 
(Ui1 + Ei1 > Ui3 + Ei3 ) ] 
(c:i3 - c:i1 < ui1 - ui3 ) ] (5) 
(6) 
(7 ) 
The joint distribution for the 'T/i ,jl will be bivariate normal, with covariance matrix: 
This allows us to write the probability that voter i will choose candidate 1 as: 
U;1 -U;2 U;1 -U;3 
n jv,,.2 +,,.? -2a-; 1 2 j ...Ja-? +,,.2 -2a-; 13 b (  ) d  d r il = _ 00  "1 "2 ' _ 00  "1 "3 ' 1 'T/i ,2 1 , 'T/i ,31 ; rl 'T/i ,2 1 'T/i ,31
(8) 
(9) 
with b1 being the standardized bivariate normal distribution and r1 being the correlation 
between 'T/i ,2 1 and 'T/i ,31 :
a� - a · 13 - a · 1 2 + a · 23i , 1  z ,  i ,  i ,  
Similar expressions for Pi2 and Pi3 can be easily obtained. 
To simplify exposition, we define : 
with similar expressions for the remaining Ujk · We then define: 
(10) 
(1 1)  
(12) 
which again produce similar definitions for Ujk · This allows us to facilitate writing our 
earlier expressions for : Pii ,  Pi2 , and Pi3 as follows: 
f 012 JU13 Pi1 = _ 00  _ 00 b1 ( 'T/i ,2 1 , 'T/i ,31 ; rl )d'f/i ,2 1 d'f/i ,31
8 . 1 .2 Parameterization of the Error Variances and Est imat i o n  
(13) 
We can now estimate the model, once we have determined how to parameterize the error 
variances. 1 2 Using the covariance matrices defined above , we can identify and estimate
selected elements of the utility function errors, �i (Bolduc 1 992 ;  Bunch 1 99 1 ;  Daganzo 
1 979 ; Keane 1 992). In our empirical work, we assume homoskedasticity; i.e. , we assume 
that ai = ai = aj = 1 . 13 Whereas in their seminal work Hausman and Wise posited
the error variances to be linear functions of independent variables, we estimate directly 
values for the error covariances, a1 2 , a13 , a23 (referred to in the text as: aBc ,  aBP ,  and 
acp ). These estimates can be considered error correlations, due to our normalization of 
the error variances. 
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9 App endix II 
9.1 Calc ulat ion of Alternat ive C hoice for Perot Voters 
Recall that voter i 's utility for voting for candidate j is given as 
where we can define Uij as the systemic component: 
(14) 
(1 5) 
Now if Perot were not in the race, the probability of the ith voter choosing Bush would 
be: 
Pi,Bush = Pr [ (Ui,Bush + Ei ,Bush > Ui,Clinton + Ei ,Clinton ) ] 
Pr [ (Ei ,Clinton - Ei ,Bush < Ui,Bush - Ui,Clinton ) ] 
Now we make use of the fact that: 
'f/i ,CB = Ei ,Clinton - Ei,Bush 
(16) 
(1 7) 
Since 'f/i ,GB is a bivariate normal random variable, its marginal distribution is normal. 
And given our expression for the variance of 'f/i ,GB we can express the probability of 
choosing Bush out of the set (Bush, Clinton) as: 
n ;r,. ( Ui,Bush - Ui,Glinton ) 
) .Li ,Bush = 'l' ----;==============
(J'l,Bush + O'l,czinton - 20'i,Bush-Glinton
(18) 
Now given our normalization of variances O'i,Bush = O'i,Glinton = 1 ;  and our estimate 
of O'i ,Bush-Glinton = - .08 we have everything we need to compute Pi,Bush · 
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Tabl e  1 
Vote- Choice By Economics,  Ideology and Anger i n  t h e  1 992 Election 
B ush Clint o n  Perot 
% N % N % N 
Personal Finances Better 42 . 7  2 1 7  38 .2  1 94 1 9 . 1  9 7  
Same 38 .6  225 46 . 3  270 1 5 . 1  88 
Worse 2 1 . 5  1 2 1  58 . 1 327 20 .4 1 1 5  
National Economy Better 71. 1  54 15 ;8 1 2  1 3 . 2  1 0  
Same 5 1 . 3  1 96 30 . 9  1 1 8  1 7 . 8  68 
Worse 26 . 0  309 55 .4 659 1 8 . 6  221  
Party Identification Republican 70 . 2  466 9 . 5  6 3  20 . 3  1 35 
Independent 22 . 9  33  4 1 . 0  59 36 . 1  52 
Democrat 7 . 6  64 78 . 9  667 1 3 . 5  1 14 
Vote Choice in 1 988 Bush 55 . 0  4 10  23 . 6  1 76 2 1 .4 160 
Dukakis 5 . 2  25 83 . 1  403 1 1 . 8 57 
Did Not Vote 29 .5  80  50 .6  137  1 9 . 9  54 
Gender Men 34 .8 271  42 . 5  33 1  22 . 6  1 76 
Women 33 . 3  293 52 .5  462 14 . 2  1 25 
Term Limits Favor 35 .5  435 45 . 6  559 1 8 . 9  232 
Oppose 24 . 2  64 59 . 2  1 5 7  1 6 . 6  44 
Deficit Not Imp 32 . 9  342 5 1 . 3  534 1 5 . 9  1 65 
Important 36 . 9  1 76 40 . 3  1 92 22 . 9  1 0 9  
A bortion Pro-Life 47 . 5  66 40 . 3  56 1 2 . 2  1 7  
Only-Rape 46 . 3  202 37 .8  165  1 5 . 8  6 9  
When-Needed 42 . 2  1 00 39 . 2  93 1 8 . 6  44 
Pro-Choice 22 .3  180 57 .4  464 20 . 3  1 64 
Entire Sample 34 .2 564 47 .8  793 1 8 . 2  3 0 1  
Note: Percentages hsted are row percentages. 
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Table 2: 
D istribution of Respondent P lacements of Self and Candidat es o n  Ideology 
Respondent Self-Placement 
Bush ldeologya 
Bush: ldeological-Distanceb 
Dukakis ldeologya 
Dukakis: ldeological-Distanceb 
Clinton ldeologya 
Clinton: ldeological-Distanceb 
Perot ldeologya 
Perot: ldeological-Distanceb 
a Mean placement of candidate by respondents. 
1 988 
4. 37
5 . 1 1
1 . 24 
3 . 24 
1 . 50 
1 992  
4. 2 1
5 . 05 
1 . 3 1  
3 . 1 9  
1 .46 
4. 3 1
1 . 1 5 
b Mean ideological distance between candidate and respondent. 
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Table 3 
Multinomi'al Probit Estimates For a Three-Candidate Model 
(Perot Coefficients Normalized to Zero) 
Coefficients for: 
Independent 
Variables Bush Clinton 
Ideological Dist . - . 09 *  
. 0 2  
Constant .50 - .44 
.44 .58 
Felt  Personal Finances Were Worse - . 04 .02  
.05 .05 
Felt  National Economy Was Worse - . 14** . 2 1 *  
.08 . 1 0  
Oppose Gov 't Jobs .07 - .0 1 
.05 .05  
Oppose Gov 't Health Care . 1 0 *  . 0 6  
.05 .04 
Oppose Gov 't Minority Assistance . 0 1  - . 1 7* 
.05  .05 
Abortion - .35* . 0 1 
. 14 . 1 1  
Region (East ) - . 1 5  . 3 2  
. 1 7  . 2 1  
Region (South) .25 .50* 
. 1 8 . 1 9  
Region (West) - . 1 1  - . 0 3  
. 1 8  . 2 1  
N e w  o r  Returning Voter .28**  - .23*  
. 1 5 . 1 7  
Term Limits .06 .08  
. 1 3 . 1 1  
Felt  Deficit Was a M ajor Problem - . 58* - . 003 
.22 . 1 8  
Democrat - . 1 9  1 . 34* 
. 1 7  . 2 8  
Republican LOO* - .74 
.43 .46 
Gender (Female) . 38*  . 2 1  
. 1 9  . 14 
Respondent 's Education . 14* .004 
.07 .06  
Age : 1 8-29 - . 86* - . 57* 
.41  .26  
Age : 30-44 - . 64* - . 54* 
.30 . 1 9  
Age : 45-59 - . 5 1 *  - . 1 0 
.24 . 2 1  
O"BC � ,os 
.28 
<fBP . 27  
.54 
<Tep - . 0 7  
.26  
L L  = -568 . 1 8 ;  Percent-Correct = 70 . 6 ;  N umber of  Observations = 909 
Note : M aximum-likelihood estimates with their estimated standard errors below . * indicates an estimate significant 
at the p = . 0 5  level . * * indicates an estimate significant at the p= . 1 0  level . 
Table 4 
Effects of Economi cs, Issues, and Anger in t h e  1 9 92 Election 
Probability of Voting For: 
Bush Clinton Perot 
Personal Finances Better 0 .42 0 . 3 1  0 .27 
Worse 0 .35 0 .35 0 .29 
D ifference 0.07 -0 .05 -0 . 02 
National Economy Better 0 .54 0. 1 9 0 .27 
· Worse 0 .24 0 .49 0 .27 
D ifference 0.29 -0 . 30  0 .00 
Voter I deolog'!f Near 0.46 0 .39  0. 3 1
Far 0 .32 0 .28 0 .20 
D ifference 0. 14 0. 1 1 0. 1 2
Minorities Assist. 0 .30 0 .48 0 .22 
No Assist. 0 .46 0 .20 0 .33 
D ifference -0 . 1 7  0 .27  -0. 1 1  
Abortion Pro-Life 0 .62 0 .22 0. 1 6
Pro-Choice 0. 28 0 .38 0 .34 
D ifference 0 .34 -0 . 1 6  -0 . 18  
Term Limits For 0 .39 0 .33 0 .28 
Against 0 .38 0 .32 0 .30 
D ifference 0. 0 1 0 . 0 1  -0 .02 
Deficit Not Important 0 .39 0 .33 0 .28 
Important 0 .22 0 .40 0 .38 
D ifference 0. 1 7 -0 .07  -0 .09 
Note: Table entries are the predicted probabilities of a hypothetical individual voting 
for Clinton, Bush or Perot based on different values of the row-variable. The profiles 
of this hypothetical voter are discussed in the text. 
a Probabilities for each of the candidates in the voter-ideology row are based on the 
ideological distance between the voter and the particular candidate. 
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Table SA 
D istribut i o n  of Resp ondent P references on the Economya 
1 988 1 992 
Respondent Views of: Better Same Worse Better Same Worse 
National Economy 18 . 8  50 . 0  3 1 . 2  4 . 6  23 . 1  72 . 3  
Personal Finances 42 .4 32 . 8  24 . 8  30 . 3  35 . 0  34. 7
Note: Table entries indicate percentage of respondents in the appropriate category. 
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Table 5B 
Effects of Changes in D istributio n  of 
Res p o n dent P references : 1 988 Economy S imulat ion 
Sample (N=909) 
Predicted Vote Share for: 
Bush Clinton Perot 
1 992 34 . 0 46 . 0  20 . 1  
Respondent Finances - 1 988 34. 2 45 . 7  20 . 0  
National Economy - 1 988 37 .6  
Respondent Finances and 
National Economy - 1 988 
28 
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1 0  Endnotes 
1 Proj ection refers to the phenomena of respondents 'projecting' their position onto the candidate of their 
choice; this would cause respondents to appear closer to their choice then they really are (Brody and 
Page 1972) . 
2 Bush moved only a slight bit to the left from 1988 to 1992 in respondents ' perceptions : from 5 . 11 
to 5 . 0 5 .  Thus the voters saw the two maj or party candidates in roughly the same positions in 1992 as 
they did in 1988 .  
3 Generalized Extreme-Value models also allow for IIA to b e  violated ; but since they still impose a 
stronger assumption on the disturbances than does M NP we use the MNP model. 
4We estimated models in which we relaxed this assumption . In those models , the three estimated 
coefficients for ideological distance were not statistically distinct from each other . 
5 We estimated a model with an identical systemic component using both a GEV and an independent 
probit (the independent probit model is a special case of MNP where all off-diagonal elements of the 
error covariance matrix are constrained to be zero) . There are no appreciable differences in the estimated 
coefficients in either the GEV nor the independent probit estimates. In the GEV results , the estimates 
of the inclusive values were not informative about the groupings of the candidates. 
6 In the NES sub-sample of 909 respondents we use , there is a slight (3%) positive bias for Clinton,
which our multinomial probit model reproduces. 
7These predictions are are the average value of F; over the 909 respondents in our sample.
8The reader used to seeing 'race' as a variable in models of vote-choice in American national elections 
will not find it here. So few blacks in the sample voted for Perot that it was impossible for us to estimate 
the coefficient. However , we ran the model on a sample of only whites and got essentially identical 
results . 
9This was done by comparing the 1992 distribution of preferences on the national economy for our 
subsample of 909 voters that we estimated our model on to the 1988 distribution . For respondents who
rated the economy as ' worse ' in 1992 we randomly reassigned 58% of them to the 'same' category. We
randomly reassigned 64% of the respondents who rated the economy as 'same' in 1992 to the 'better'
category. This gave us a distribution matching 1988 .  A similar procedure was performed for ratings of 
respondent's personal finances . 
1 0 In Appendix II we describe this calculation in more detail. 
1 1T hese numbers are the average probability of voting for Bush and for Clinton among the Perot 
voters , as described in Appendix I I .  
1 2 In this section we drop the i subscript for the sake of exposition . 
13We tested this assumption in some alternative specifications and found no evidence that any of these 
three error variances violate this assumption.  
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